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1. Introduction
There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to de-
fer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, ob-
jective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences,
and evidential (or logical) probabilities. But how, precisely, ought we
defer to these experts? Exactly what constraint does a deference re-
quirement place on an agent’s credences at a particular time?
In this paper we consider three possible answers, inspired by three
different principles that have been proposed for deference to objec-
tive chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the
other kinds of epistemic experts mentioned above. Besides assuming
a baseline probabilism about rational credences, we are particularly
interested in the following two desiderata:
• A deference principle should be consistent with both the agent’s
and the experts’ updating by Conditionalization.
• A deference principle should permit agents to have various kinds
of doubts about what’s rationally required.
Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of
the options face insuperable difficulties meeting these desiderata. The
third, on the other hand, fares well — at least when it is applied in a
particular way.
2. Deferring to experts
We begin by setting out the problem in general terms, not assuming
that we are dealing with any particular sort of epistemic expert. Let
L be a language. Let C1, . . . ,Cn be a finite set of distributions over L,
which we’ll call the candidate distributions. That is, each Ci takes each
sentence in L and assigns it a real number in [0, 1]. We will assume
the candidate distributions are probability functions. Let e1, . . . , en be
among the atomic sentences of L. We will take the sentence ei to ex-
press the proposition that candidate Ci is the true expert (with the
relevant sense of expertise to be filled in for each of our applications).
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Call these the expert hypotheses.1 We assume that the candidates take
the e1, . . ., en to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.2
Given a body of evidence E, call a candidate Ci immodest in the
presence of E just in case Ci(ei | E) = 1 — that is, Ci becomes certain
of its own expertise upon supposing E. Call a candidate modest in the
presence of E if it isn’t immodest. Given a particular feature candidates
might have, call a candidate Ci tolerant of that feature in the presence of
E just in case there is Cj possessing the feature to which Ci assigns
positive credence of expertise conditional on E — that is, Ci(ej | E) > 0.
So, for example, Ci is tolerant of immodesty in the presence of E just in
case there’s a Cj immodest in the presence of E such that Ci(ej | E) >
0. (Henceforth we will suppress ‘in the presence of E’ where context
makes the relevant E clear.) Notice that all immodest candidates are
tolerant of immodesty.
Now suppose we also have an agent. Just like the candidates, the
agent has a distribution over L, which we’ll label cr. We assume cr is
a probability function. We additionally assume that the agent, like the
candidates, takes the e1, . . ., en to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Finally, we let E be the agent’s total evidence.
Suppose that when the agent sets her credences, she should try to
defer to whichever candidate is the expert. The agent may be uncer-
tain which candidate is the true expert, so we cannot direct her simply
to defer to that one. Instead, we need a requirement incorporating the
agent’s opinions about the candidates’ expertise. Howmight we formu-
late this requirement precisely as a constraint on her credence function
cr? Here are three possibilities:
1. For the sake of clarity and an issue that may come up later, if ei were put
into a natural-language sentence, it wouldn’t say something like “Distribution
Ci is an expert”; instead it would say something like “The distribution that
assigns 0.5 to a1, 0.7 to a2, etc. is an expert.” In other words, the propositions
represented by the ei refer to the candidates by description, not by name.
2. That is, Ck(eiej) = 0 for all i 6= j. And Ck(e1 _ . . . _ en) = 1.
(PX) For all x 2 L and all Ci,
cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | E)
providing cr(ei),Ci(E) > 0. If Ci(E) = 0, then cr(ei) = 0.
This generalizes David Lewis’ Principal Principle to experts other
than chance functions [Lewis, 1980]. If the agent assigns positive
credence to Ci being the true expert and Ci assigns positive prob-
ability to the agent’s evidence E, then the agent ought to set her
credence in x conditional on Ci being the true expert to whatever
value Ci assigns to x once it has been brought up to speed with E.
An agent should assign no probability to a distribution being the
true expert if that distribution assigns no probability to the agent’s
evidence being true. In that case, the agent’s credence in x condi-
tional on Ci being the true expert is undefined and (PX) imposes no
further constraints.
On certain views of evidence, this latter condition may sound im-
plausible. Suppose I have evidence E but I am uncertain of this
fact. Then surely I am not obliged to rule out a distribution as a
candidate expert on the grounds that it assigns no probability to
E. This is true, but this is not the account of evidence we assume
here. Rather, we assume, with mainstream Bayesian epistemology,
that it is a rational requirement that an agent assign credence 1 to
her evidence. This is a consequence of the Bayesian updating norm
of Conditionalization, for instance.
(NX) For all x 2 L and all Ci,
cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | Eei)
providing cr(ei),Ci(Eei) > 0. If Ci(Eei) = 0, then cr(ei) = 0.
This generalizes Ned Hall’s and Michael Thau’s New Principle
[Thau, 1994], [Hall, 1994]. If the agent assigns positive credence to
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Ci being the true expert and Ci assigns positive probability to the
conjunction of the agent’s total evidence E and Ci being the true ex-
pert, then the agent ought to set her credence in x conditional on Ci
being the true expert to whatever value Ci assigns to x once it has
been brought up to speed with E and the fact that Ci is the expert. An
agent should assign no probability to a distribution being the true
expert if that distribution assigns no probability to the conjunction
of her total evidence E and Ci being the true expert. In that case,
the agent’s credence in x conditional on Ci being the true expert is
undefined and (NX) imposes no further constraints.
(IX) For all x 2 L,
cr(x) =
n
Â
i=1
cr(ei) · Ci(x | E)
providing Ci(E) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. If Ci(E) = 0, then the
corresponding term cr(ei) · Ci(x | E) — which is anyway undefined
— is omitted from the sum.
This generalizes Jenann Ismael’s General Recipe [Ismael, 2008]. The
agent ought to set her credence in x to her expectation of the ex-
pert’s value for x once the expert has been brought up to speed
with the agent’s total evidence.
The ‘X’s in the names of these principles are meant to evoke vari-
ables; depending on the type of expert one considers, these princi-
ples might become variants of van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle [van
Fraassen, 1984], Elga’s guru principle [Elga, 2007], Christensen’s Ra-
tional Reflection principle [Christensen, 2010], etc. Initially, we submit,
each principle seems plausible for all these applications. They might
even seem to be equivalent. But with the possibility of modest distri-
butions on the table, they are not:
Proposition 2.1
1. (PX) entails (IX). But no other entailment relations hold between the three
principles.
2. However, if all candidates are immodest in the presence of evidence E, the
three principles make the same demands on an agent with total evidence E.
3. Just as (PX) entails (IX), (NX) entails a constraint on the unconditional cre-
dences assigned by cr in much the same way:
cr(x) =
n
Â
i=1
cr(ei) · Ci(x | Eei)
(All proofs are given in the appendix.)
One might wonder why, in each case, the candidate distributions to
which we defer are brought up to speed with the agent’s total evidence
at the time of deference. If these distributions are really candidates for
being experts for our agent, surely they already have at least as much
evidence as she does? Not necessarily. Ned Hall draws an illuminating
distinction between treating a distribution as an analyst expert and as a
database expert [Hall, 2004]. We defer to database experts because of the
evidence they have; we defer to analyst experts because of their talents
at analyzing evidence they are given and assigning credences on the
basis of that analysis. Certainly an analyst expert may be worthy of our
deference even if our evidence exceeds hers. But it can also be worth
deferring to a database expert who lacks some evidence we’ve got. I
defer to a meteorologist on matters of tomorrow’s weather at least in
part because she is a database expert — her evidence about today’s
weather, for instance, is more extensive than mine. But that doesn’t
mean she has all of my evidence about today’s weather; I know the
weather at my precise location, whereas she is unlikely to. Nonetheless,
her evidence is more extensive than mine, so I defer to her.
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For both analyst and database experts, one should bring them up
to speed on one’s extra evidence before deferring to their opinions.3
(PX), (NX), and (IX) are designed to do that. Moreover, formulating
the principles this way lends them extra generality. If the candidates
possess the agent’s total evidence E already, conditionalizing on E does
not alter their distributions. So even if one wants to restrict an agent’s
attention to candidates with at least as much evidence as she, there is
no harm in E’s place in these principles.
In the next two sections, we examine the formal features of the
three deference principles. For readers who want to skip the technical
presentation of our results and head directly to their interpretation in
section 5, those results are:
• (PX), (IX), and (NX) all require that an agent be certain that the true
expert assigns her evidence positive probability.
• (PX) requires, furthermore, that the agent be certain that the true
expert is immodest in the presence of E.
• (PX) is preserved by Conditionalization.
• (IX) requires, furthermore, that the agent be certain that the true
expert is intolerant of immodesty in other candidates.
• (IX) is not preserved by Conditionalization.
• (NX) requires nothing more of our agent’s opinions about the true
expert than that she be certain that it assigns positive probability
to her evidence; (NX) makes demands on her other credences only
once she has set her credences in the various expert hypotheses.
• (NX) may fail to be preserved by Conditionalization when two can-
didates converge on the same posterior distribution. Absent such
convergence, Conditionalization preserves (NX).
3. Compare Elga’s discussion of “guru” vs. “expert” principles [Elga, 2007].
3. Modesty and deference
(PX) imposes constraints on the credences an agent may assign to a
proposition conditional on an expert hypothesis. But these constraints
entail another constraint.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose Ci is modest in the presence of the agent’s total
evidence E — that is, Ci(ei | E) < 1. Then (PX) entails that cr(ei) = 0.
That is, (PX) demands that our agent be certain that the expert is im-
modest in the presence of the agent’s total evidence; the agent must as-
sign no credence whatsoever to modest candidates. One consequence
is that if all candidates are modest, there are no probabilistic credences
that satisfy (PX).
As we noted above, provided at least some candidates are modest
in the presence of the agent’s total evidence, (IX) is a weaker constraint
than (PX). We might hope, then, that it will not require the same cer-
tainty in immodesty required by (PX). (IX) does not require that partic-
ular certainty, but it requires another.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose Ci is tolerant of immodesty in other candidates —
that is, there is Cj 6= Ci such that Cj(ej | E) = 1 and Ci(ej | E) > 0. Then
(IX) entails that cr(ei) = 0.
That is, (IX) requires the agent to be certain that the expert rules out
all immodest candidates other than himself.
By contrast, (NX) does not require an agent to withhold credence
from any particular candidate. Indeed, for any non-negative l1, . . ., ln
that sum to 1, there is cr satisfying (NX) that assigns credence li to
expert hypothesis ei — that is, cr(ei) = li. Define:
cr(x) =
n
Â
i=1
liCi(x | Eei)
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Then cr(ei) = li for all i, and cr satisfies (NX).4
In the second half of the paper, we will argue that these features
rule out (PX) and (IX) as deference principles for a number of interpre-
tations of the candidate distributions. Before we do that, we consider
the diachronic constraints imposed by our principles.
4. Updating and deference
Suppose that, at some initial time t, our agent’s credences are given by
cr. At that time, the distributions C1, . . ., Cn are the candidate experts;
and the proposition ei expresses the expert hypothesis that Ci is the ex-
pert distribution at t. Now suppose that our agent gains some evidence
E between t and a later time t0. Her credences at t0 are given by cr0. At
that later time, the distributions D1, . . ., Dm are the candidate experts;
and the proposition fi expresses the expert hypothesis that Di is the
expert distribution at t0. One might wonder under what circumstances
the following four conditions can simultaneously be met:
(i) The distributions D1, . . ., Dm are obtained by conditionalizing the
distributions C1, . . ., Cn on E.5
(ii) cr satisfies one of our three deference principles with respect to the
distributions C1, . . ., Cn.
4. After all, for all ek such that cr(ek) > 0:
cr(x | ek) = cr(xek)cr(ek) =
Âni=1 liCi(xek | Eei)
Âni=1 liCi(ek | Eei)
= Ci(x | Eek)
as required.
5. For some interpretations of the candidate functions it will be implausible
to suppose that the candidates and the agent update on the same proposi-
tion between two times. Suppose we are considering chance as an expert.
Chances evolve by conditionalizing on whatever actually transpires between
two times, which may be distinct from what the agent learns between those
times. Nonetheless, the sort of situation we consider — in which the candi-
date and the agent learn exactly the same proposition between t and t0 — could
arise for any sort of expert. So it is legitimate to ask how our putative deference
principles would treat such a situation and to judge them on the answer.
(iii) cr0 is obtained from cr by conditionalizing on E;
(iv) cr0 satisfies the same deference principle, but with respect to the
distributions D1, . . ., Dm.
We will now take up each of our deference principles in turn, and
consider for that principle under what circumstances all four of these
conditions can be met.
4.1 (PX) and Conditionalization
We’ll start by taking (PX) as our deference principle.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose cr satisfies (PX) at t, cr0 is obtained from cr by
updating on E, and the distributions D1, . . . ,Dm are obtained from the
C1, . . . ,Cn by conditionalizing on E. Then cr0 satisfies (PX) at t0.
In other words, conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) above together entail condi-
tion (iv). When this happens, we say that Conditionalization preserves
(PX): Conditionalization takes (PX) distributions to (PX) distributions.
4.2 (IX) and Conditionalization
Things do not work out so happily for (IX) and (NX). We consider (IX)
first. There are situations in which cr satisfies (IX), cr0 is obtained from
cr by Conditionalization, but cr0 does not satisfy (IX). This is because,
in general, linear averaging doesn’t commute with conditionalizing.6
This is illustrated by the following example:
Example 1 Suppose the atomic sentences of L are e1, e2, a1, a2.
• e1 says that the candidate distribution C1 is the true expert;
• e2 says that the candidate distribution C2 is the true expert;
• there is no constraint on the interpretation of a1 or a2 — they might be sen-
tences about the weather, or about the outcome of a basketball game.
The following table gives:
6. Cf. [Jehle and Fitelson, 2009] and [Lehrer and Wagner, 1981].
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• A prior distribution cr, the agent’s distribution at t;
• Two distributions C1 and C2 that we will take to be the candidates at t. cr
satisfies (IX) with respect to C1 and C2.
• The posterior distribution cr0, which is obtained from cr by conditionalizing
on evidence a2.
• Two distributions D1 and D2 that we will take to be the candidates at t0. They
are obtained from C1 and C2 by conditionalizing on a2.
Each row of the table corresponds to a way that the world could be: e.g. e2a1a2
is the world at which e2 is true, a1 false, and a2 true.
cr C1 C2 cr0 D1 D2
e1a1a2 3/32 0 3/16 3/16 0 1/4
e1a1a2 3/32 3/16 0 0 0 0
e1a1a2 3/32 3/16 0 3/16 3/4 0
e1a1a2 7/32 6/16 1/16 0 0 0
e2a1a2 9/32 0 9/16 9/16 0 3/4
e2a1a2 1/32 1/16 0 0 0 0
e2a1a2 1/32 1/16 0 1/16 1/4 0
e2a1a2 5/32 2/16 3/16 0 0 0
Let:
• f1 be the proposition that D1 is the true expert at t0;
• f2 be the proposition that D2 is the true expert at t0.
At t0, the agent is certain that e1 ⌘ f1 and e2 ⌘ f2. So we can use cr0 values
in the ei to determine cr0 values in the fi. But then cr0 does not satisfy (IX)
with respect to the candidates D1 and D2. After all:
cr0(a1) =
3
4
6= 5
8
= cr0( f1)D1(a1) + cr0( f2)D2(a1)
Thus, satisfaction of (IX) is not preserved by Conditionalization.
4.3 (NX) and Conditionalization
We have seen that Conditionalization preserves (PX) but not (IX). How
does (NX) fare? The answer, it turns out, depends on the relation-
ship between the candidates at t and the candidates at t0. Recall that
C1, . . . ,Cn are the candidates at t, D1, . . . ,Dm are the candidates at t0,
and E is the evidence on which the candidates and the agent condition
between t and t0. If we have i 6= j such that Ci(  | E) = Cj(  | E) =
Dk( ), we will say that Ci and Cj converge to Dk upon receipt of E.
It turns out that if no two candidates at the earlier time converge to
a single candidate upon receipt of the evidence obtained by the later
time, then (NX) is preserved by Conditionalization.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that, between t and t0, the candidates update by
conditionalizing on E and no two candidates converge upon receipt of E. Then,
if cr satisfies (NX), and cr0 is obtained from cr by conditionalizing on E, then
cr0 satisfies (NX).
However, this is not guaranteed if some of the candidates at t do con-
verge upon receipt of the evidence obtained by t0, as illustrated by the
following example:7
Example 2 Suppose C1 and C2 are the candidates at t and D is the candidate
on which they converge at t0. As above, a2 is both the evidence our agent learns
and the proposition on which the earlier candidates update to obtain the later
candidate. That is, D( ) = C1(  | a2) = C2(  | a2). Also, as above, ei says
that Ci is the true expert at t, while f says that D is the true expert at t0.
Thus, f ⌘ e1 _ e2.
7. This phenomenon was brought to our attention by Grant Reaber.
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cr C1 C2 cr0 D
e1a1a2 2/17 1/9 1/6 26/137 2/9
e1a1a2 9/68 1/8 1/16 0 0
e1a1a2 2/17 1/9 1/6 26/137 2/9
e1a1a2 9/68 1/8 1/16 0 0
e2a1a2 1/13 1/18 1/12 17/137 1/9
e2a1a2 3/52 1/8 1/16 0 0
e2a1a2 4/13 2/9 1/3 68/137 4/9
e2a1a2 3/52 1/8 1/16 0 0
Then cr satisfies (NX) with respect to C1 and C2. And cr0 is obtained from
cr by conditionalizing on a2. But cr0 does not satisfy (NX) with respect to D.
After all, cr0( f ) = D( f ) = D(e1 _ e2) = 1, yet
cr0(a1 | f ) = 43137 6=
1
3
= C1(a1 | a2 f ) = D(a1 | f )
To give an indication of why such examples exist, consider why (PX) is
preserved by conditionalization. First, note that f ⌘ e1 _ e2. Thus, we
have
cr0(a1 | f ) = cr(a1 | a2 f ) = cr(a1 | a2e1 _ a2e2)
Now, if cr obeys (PX), we have
cr(a1 | a2e1) = C1(a1 | a2) = D(a1) = C2(a1 | a2) = cr(a1 | a2e2)
since C1 and C2 converge to D upon receipt of a2. In general, if
c(X | A) = c(X | B) and A and B are mutually exclusive, then c(X | A_
B) = c(X | A) = c(X | B). So
cr0(a1 | f ) = cr(a1 | a2e1 _ a2e2) = cr(a1 | a2e1) = cr(a1 | a2e2) = D(a1)
Thus cr0 satisfies (PX) with respect to D. Why doesn’t analogous rea-
soning establish that (NX) is preserved by conditionalization? The
problem is that, in general, we don’t have
cr(a1 | a2e1) = cr(a1 | a2e2)
If cr satisfies (PX), then cr(a1 | a2ei) = Ci(a1 | a2). If cr satisfies
(NX), then cr(a1 | a2ei) = Ci(a1 | a2ei). And, while we always have
C1(a1 | a2) = C2(a1 | a2) because C1 and C2 converge upon receipt of a2,
such convergence does not guarantee that C1(a1 | a2e1) = C2(a1 | a2e2).
This completes our investigation of the formal consequences of
(PX), (IX), and (NX). To repeat our earlier summary:
• (PX), (IX), and (NX) all require that an agent be certain that the true
expert assigns her evidence positive probability.
• (PX) requires, furthermore, that the agent be certain that the true
expert is immodest in the presence of E.
• (PX) is preserved by Conditionalization.
• (IX) requires, furthermore, that the agent be certain that the true
expert is intolerant of immodesty in other candidates.
• (IX) is not preserved by Conditionalization.
• (NX) requires nothing more of our agent’s opinions about the true
expert than that she be certain that it assigns positive probability
to her evidence; (NX) makes demands on her other credences only
once she has set her credences in the various expert hypotheses.
• (NX) may fail to be preserved by Conditionalization when two can-
didates converge on the same posterior distribution. Absent such
convergence, Conditionalization preserves (NX).
In the following sections, we’ll investigate the implications of these
formal facts for deference to different sorts of experts.
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5. Deferring to outside experts
We will consider three sorts of expert to which an agent might de-
fer: herself (either currently or in the future), other agents, and ideal
agents.8 We begin, in this section, by considering other agents.
5.1 Outside experts and modesty
You are attending a conference on climate science. In the room are
some of the world’s best climatologists. All have the same evidence,
and they all have all the evidence you have. But some, you believe,
are better than others at assessing that evidence. Indeed, you believe
that one is better than all the others, and that’s the one you want to
set your credences by as far as propositions concerning the Earth’s
climate go. Unfortunately, you don’t know which one it is.9 Let L be
a language. It includes sentences about Earth’s climate. Let C1, . . ., Cn
be the climatologists’ distributions over the sentences in L. Let ei be
the sentence in L that says that Ci is the best climate scientist at the
conference. As academics are wont to do, each of the candidates Ci
assigns probabilities to each of the ej. Your credences are given by cr,
another distribution over the sentences of L. You ought to do your best
to defer to the best candidate. What constraint does that place on cr?10
Consider (PX). By Proposition 3.1, this demands that you assign no
credence to any candidate Ci such that Ci(ei) < 1. Thus, regardless
8. For a related treatment of the case of deference to chance, see Pettigrew [ta].
9. We realize it is somewhat artificial to imagine a situation with a unique best
expert to whom you try to defer at the expense of all others. In most situations,
the experts will be equally good, or each will have greater expertise in their
particular specialty — glaciology, for instance, or the El Niño Southern Oscil-
lation. We have nothing to say here about what to do in these situations: that
is the preserve of judgement aggregation. Nonetheless, the sort of scenario we
treat does arise: moreover, it provides a good parallel to other expert situations
we will consider later, and is also a limiting case of various expertise situations
one might find in real life.
10. Compare the discussion in Elga [2007]. Since the deference principles we’re
considering allow for the possibility that the true expert lacks some evidence
you have, Elga would class them as “guru” principles rather than “expert”
principles.
of the candidate distributions you face in the room, you should be
certain that whichever of the scientists is the best, she is herself certain
that she is the best. That is, unless every scientist in the room is modest,
in which case you must assign no credence to any of them being the
best. Yet you are certain that one is the credences will not be best. So,
in that situation, your additive.
(IX) improves the situation, but not by much. By Proposition 3.2,
(IX) demands that you assign no credence to any candidate Ci for
which there is Cj 6= Ci such that Cj(ej) = 1 and Ci(ej) > 0. Thus,
again regardless of the candidates in the room, you are certain that
whichever scientist is best, she is certain that no colleague who is im-
modest is best.
Suppose Professor X thinks she may well be the best climatologist
in the room; but she also entertains the possibility that in fact it is
Professor Y; Professor Y, on the other hand, is absolutely certain that
he is best. Does this rule out the possibility that Professor X is the
best scientist in the room? It seems not.11 But (IX) demands that you
assign no credence to Professor X being the best climatologist in the
room. Thus, (IX) demands of you that you assign no credence at all to
a genuine possibility (thereby violating Regularity as well as common
sense).
Of course, we are all familiar with cases in which plausible epis-
temic norms demand assigning no credence at all to a genuine possi-
bility. The principle of indifference demands this when an agent con-
siders an infinite, fair lottery. But this is not one of those situations. In
those situations, the mathematical representation of probability is to
blame. (The Archimedean property of the reals entails that there is just
no “room” for a positive probability small enough for our purposes.)
11. The literature on expert-opinion elicitation shows that it’s a complex, con-
tingent question how an expert’s accuracy is related to ratings of his expertise
(both by others and by himself). See, for instance, Koriat [2012] and Burgman
et al. [2011].
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But that is not the case here: it’s not the mathematical representation
that’s to blame — it’s the norm.
One might respond to our arguments against (PX) and (IX) by say-
ing that these deference principles should not apply to the expert hy-
potheses themselves. Instead of being quantified over all sentences x
in the language L, (PX) and (IX) should be quantified only over those
that do not contain the atomic eis. Call this the restricted-scope response,
since it is based on the claim that the expert hypotheses fall outside
the scope of the deference principle in question.12
The first thing to say about the restricted-scope response is that,
formally speaking, it works. If one restricts the scope of (PX) and (IX) in
this way, they no longer have the consequences we identified. Indeed,
restricted in this way, (PX) and (IX) are as permissive as (NX). For
any non-negative reals l1, . . ., ln that sum to 1, there are credences
that satisfy the restricted version of (PX) that assign credence li to
expert hypothesis ei regardless of the modesty or otherwise of Ci. And
similarly for the restricted version of (IX).
However, the second thing to say is that, philosophically speaking,
this response fails. Of course, in the particular case we are consider-
ing — deference to the best climatologist at the conference — it might
be that we should restrict our deference principle in the manner sug-
gested: perhaps we have empirical evidence that climate scientists are
poor judges of their own expertise and that of their peers. But there
will be situations in which the outside expert to whom we defer is an
expert not only about the subject matter in question, but also about
their own expertise and that of their peers. And, whatever the correct
account of deference is, it should be able to handle this case just as
well as it handles the restricted case.
12. Although she is not responding to the problems posed here, Jenann Is-
mael suggests something like this response in the case of deference to objec-
tive chances [Ismael, 2008]. She suggests that chance functions do not assign
chances to the chance hypotheses themselves; they assign them only to partic-
ular events. For a response to Ismael in that case, see Pettigrew [ta, §6]; and for
Ismael’s reply, see Ismael [ta].
Moreover, hypotheses about expertise are often correlated with non-
expert hypotheses. You might plausibly believe that the true expert
was the one trained at a certain school, or the one whose record of
past predictions matches the facts in particular ways. That a particular
candidate meets one of these descriptions would be a sentence in L
distinct from the ei. In extreme cases, each expert hypothesis will have
a perfectly correlated non-ei counterpart. For example, it might be that
a particular magazine is about to publish the name of the true expert
in the room, and both you and the candidates entertain opinions about
whose name will be printed. When such strict biconditionals obtain,
even restricted-scope deference principles will produce objectionable
results. For instance, (PX) will require you to be certain that whoever’s
name is printed was certain that her name would appear.
5.2 Outside experts and updating
Consider again our conference of climate scientists. At the end of the
conference, a new piece of evidence arrives: the Himalayan glaciers are
melting faster than previously thought. All the climatologists hear the
news; so do you. How should you and the climatologists update your
credences in light of this new evidence? The orthodox Bayesian answer
is that you should condition on it. However, while that updating policy
will always be consistent with (PX) (Proposition 4.1), it isn’t always
consistent with (IX) or with (NX) (Examples 1 and 2) — that is, there
are situations in which one cannot satisfy (IX) with respect to candidate
experts at t, update by the same evidence as those experts between t
and t0, and also satisfy (IX) with respect to the candidate experts at t0;
and similarly for (NX).13
One might reply: So much the worse for Conditionalization as a
general updating rule! After all, we have retained it as the correct up-
dating rule for the scientists. But, when one defers to an expert, one
13. Of course, it doesn’t follow that (IX) and Conditionalization are, strictly
speaking, inconsistent with one another in the sense that no agent could satisfy
both. An agent could satisfy both by satisfying (IX) and never updating. But
the terminology is nonetheless a helpful shorthand.
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should not update by conditionalizing on one’s new evidence; rather,
one should update each candidate by conditionalizing on the new evi-
dence, and then defer.
There are two problems with this. First, it is not obvious how
one should weight the various candidates after updating. Should one
weight them each by one’s original credence in their expertise? That
option is worrisome, as the new evidence might have some effect on
your views of their expertise. In fact, before the new evidence arrived
you might have suppositionally considered how your opinions of the
candidates would change in light of reports from the Himalayas. Con-
ditionalization directs you to be faithful to that reasoning once the new
evidence arrives, but that’s the option being ruled out. What other op-
tion is to be preferred?
A second problem: Conditionalization is not without justification.
The diachronic Dutch book is one such argument. Another is a little-
known point made by Peter M. Brown [Brown, 1976]. Suppose you
know in advance that you will receive new evidence — perhaps you
know that you will learn the rate at which the Himalayan glaciers are
melting, though you don’t know exactly which rate that will be. And
suppose you know that, after being informed about the glaciers (but
before gaining any extra evidence in addition to that), you will be
required to make a decision between a range of possible actions — per-
haps you will be asked to determine government climate policy. Sup-
pose further that you know you will make that choice by maximizing
expected utility with respect to the credences you assign at the time of
the decision. Then your current expected utility of the action you will
decide to perform is greatest if you believe that you will incorporate
the glacier evidence by conditionalizing. Thus, if you adopt the alter-
native update-the-candidates-then-defer rule just proposed, you will
expect the decisions you make on the basis of credences generated by
that rule to be worse than the decisions you would have made had you
conditioned. This is an unacceptable clash of epistemic and pragmatic
norms. Another such clash is, of course, the vulnerability to diachronic
Dutch books to which any intention to violate Conditionalization gives
rise.
So we have good reason to preserve Conditionalization. Does this
rule out (IX) and (NX) as principles of deference? We contend that it
rules out (IX) but not (NX). In the case of (IX), there is nothing we can
do to mitigate its conflict with the updating rule. But in the case of
(NX), there is — that is the lesson of Proposition 4.2.
(NX) conflicts with Conditionalization in the following sort of sit-
uation: Before the evidence comes in, you defer to the climatologists’
credences at that time in the manner proposed by (NX). Amongst these
climatologists are two who disagree before they learn the evidence, but
come to agree in all their opinions in light of the evidence. Perhaps
these climatologists strongly disagreed about what the Himalayan re-
port would say, but given that it says what it does, they agree upon
the consequences. In our earlier terminology, the new evidence makes
their credences converge. You then face a dilemma. You can either de-
fer to the climatologists’ updated credences in the manner proposed
by (NX), or you can update your own credences by conditionalizing.
But, as Example 2 shows, you can’t always do both.
The problem arises because we demand that an agent defer at dif-
ferent times to different sets of candidates. Proposition 4.2 shows that
the problem disappears if we demand that she defer to the same set of
candidates at every time: if our agent defers to the same candidates at
each time, then we can never have fi ⌘ ei1 _ . . . _ eik with k > 1, the
situation that creates the incompatibility of (NX) and Conditionaliza-
tion; rather, we will have fi ⌘ ei, for all i. But what kind of distribution
can there be such that it makes sense for the agent to constantly de-
fer to that same distribution, even as her evidence changes over time?
We submit that having identified a set of candidate experts, the agent
should defer to those candidates’ initial or prior or ur-credences — the
credences the candidates had prior to acquiring any evidence whatso-
ever, the credences the candidates condition with their evidence at a
given time to obtain their credences at that time.
The correct deference principle for outside experts is this: At any
time, an agent ought to satisfy (NX) with respect to the possible prior
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distributions of the candidates. Suppose C1, . . ., Cn are the possible
priors. There will typically be more of these than there are candidate
experts, since we may be uncertain not only about which of the candi-
dates is the expert, but also for a given candidate what prior distribu-
tion she is using to set her current credences. Suppose further that ei is
the proposition that Ci is the true expert’s actual prior distribution. Then
our agent’s credence in X conditional on Ci being the true expert’s ac-
tual prior ought to be given by bringing Ci up to speed with the agent’s
evidence and the fact that Ci is the true expert prior. This resolves the
conflict between Conditionalization and (NX) because the agent defers
to the same set of candidates at all times. While the putative experts
in front of her may gain evidence and shift their credences over time,
the set of possible ur-credences lying behind those candidates remains
constant.
One might wonder why deference to ur-credences at all times is
not vulnerable to the problems identified in section 4.3. After all, ur-
credence functions can surely converge. Indeed they can. And if our
agent were to defer to the ur-credence functions of the candidates at
one time and their updated converged credence functions at a later
time, she would fall foul of Example 2. But that is not our proposal.
Rather, we propose that she defer to the ur-credence functions of the
candidate experts at all times, regardless of evidence. And that puts
her in the situation covered by Proposition 4.2.
At first, it might seem that this move is appropriate only for de-
ferring to analyst experts — experts to whom we defer because of
their ability to analyse evidence and respond appropriately. After all,
a candidate’s prior embodies her analyst capabilities; it encodes her re-
sponse to any evidential situation. But by definition it embodies none
of her evidence. Thus, the proposal seems not to capture the deference
we owe to a database expert, since it does not give us access to the
evidence she has that we prize.
But that’s not quite right. On the current proposal, even though
we demand deference to the candidates’ prior distributions, their cur-
rent distributions do not leave the picture. The agent knows what the
candidates’ current distributions are. If we assume that the candidates’
current distributions are generated by conditionalizing their priors on
their total evidence, and if we assume those priors satisfy the Regular-
ity principle, then a candidate’s total evidence can be read off her cur-
rent distribution by seeing which propositions she assigns a credence
of 1. So when we take a candidate’s prior and feed it all of the agent’s
current evidence (including the agent’s current evidence about that
candidate’s credences), we are giving information to the prior about
what the candidate currently knows. In addition, we are giving the
prior all of the agent’s information about whether what that candidate
knows is to be trusted — whether that candidate has a database worth
deferring to.
This point also addresses another worry about the approach. It
might seem implausible that agents have opinions about the priors
from which the candidates’ current distributions have evolved. But if
an agent knows both a candidate’s current distribution and her cur-
rent total evidence, the agent can reconstruct a great deal of informa-
tion about that candidate’s prior. This will be especially true when the
agent’s evidence yields other clues about how the candidate is likely
to reason. In a room full of climatologists, it is highly likely that a
candidate’s opinions will have been shaped by certain general princi-
ples, that physically outlandish scenarios will be entertained only with
extraordinary evidence, etc. A candidate’s prior embodies her analyst
function; the very fact that a climatologist was invited to the conference
probably tells us a great deal about what kind of analyst she is.14
In sum: Neither (PX) nor (IX) provides the correct formulation of
14. It also helps here that for any given deferential situation, the agent need
not reconstruct a candidate’s entire prior — only the portions relevant to the
propositions being deferred about will be of interest to the agent. With that
said, an obvious extension of our work here would be to analyze deference
principles for agents with “imprecise credences”: levels of confidence modelled
using a range of real numbers instead of a single value. That kind of analysis
would open up more possibilities for modelling an agent’s uncertainty about
which particular prior belongs to a particular candidate.
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the deference we owe to outside experts such as climatologists, stock
market experts, or election pundits. Both principles require us to assign
no credence at all to certain genuine possibilities; moreover, the latter
principle is inconsistent with a well-motivated updating rule. (NX), on
the other hand, imposes no constraints on the credences one might
assign to expert hypotheses; and, applied to candidates’ priors rather
than their current distributions, it is always consistent with the updat-
ing rule.15
6. Rationally responding to the evidence
Some philosophers hold that, for any body of evidence, there is a
unique credence function that is the rational response to that evidence.
This is known as the Uniqueness Thesis [White, 2005; Feldman, 2007].
However, even if one does not accept the universal claim, all but the
most stridently subjectivist Bayesians will agree that there are evidential
situations admitting of only one rational response. Let us suppose that
our agent is in such a situation, and let us suppose that she knows this.
What she doesn’t know is which credence function provides the ratio-
nal response. But she has narrowed it down to a finite set C1, . . ., Cn.
(How? Perhaps a Rationality Oracle has whispered the unique rational
response in the agent’s ear, but she didn’t hear it properly. Or perhaps
the agent knows that rationality will only ever require an agent to as-
sign a credence precise to a particular number of decimal places, or
expressible in a fraction with not-too-large whole numerator and de-
nominator. . . .) As usual, let ei be the sentence saying that Ci provides
the unique rational response.
Clearly, we ought to defer to the unique rational response. So again
the question arises how to formulate that requirement precisely.
15. One might wonder why we cannot remove the incompatibility of (IX) with
Conditionalization in the same way that we removed the incompatibility of
(NX) with Conditionalization, namely, by demanding that agents defer to an
expert’s prior or initial or ur-distribution. However, in Example 1, the two can-
didate experts at t — namely, C1 and C2 — do not converge to either of the
candidate experts at t0 — namely, D1 or D2. Thus, (IX) is incompatible with
Conditionalization even when there is no convergence between t and t0.
6.1 Evidential probabilities and modesty
Consider (PX). This demands that our agent be certain that the cor-
rect rational response to her evidence is given by a candidate Ci such
that Ci(ei) = 1.16 Now some philosophers hold that the truly ratio-
nal response to a body of evidence will always be certain of its own
rationality.17 The idea is that whether or not a particular distribution
provides the unique rational response to a given body of evidence is
something knowable a priori. On an internalist account of justification,
no information about the world should be required to know what the
evidential probabilities are in the presence of a given body of evidence.
So, if one is responding correctly to one’s evidence, then one will know
it — the true rational response to evidence is always immodest.
This apriorism is a controversial view. For (PX) to be plausible, not
only must the view be true, but every evidential situation must re-
quire its agent to be certain that the view is true. By Proposition 3.1,
an agent who satisfies (PX) rules out any candidate for the evidential
probabilities that is not certain of its own expertise. So she eliminates
the possibility that adopting the credences truly required by her ev-
idence would leave her the slightest bit uncertain that she had done
so. If we are concerned with epistemic modesty, that concern should
apply equally to modesty about which epistemic theory is correct.
16. In this section we will mostly leave out the conditionalizing on E, as we
assume that the evidential probabilities for an agent — the correct credences for
her to assign on her current evidence — already incorporate that evidence.
17. See e.g. Titelbaum [ta]. A referee for this journal also helpfully pointed out
that the models of epistemic probability in Williamson [2000] imply that facts
about the evidential probabilities of particular hypotheses on particular bodies
of evidence always have evidential probability 1. Now it may seem strange for
this paper to draw out the consequences of a constraint one of its authors has
argued against. Nevertheless, a number of philosophers (such as Elga [2013]
and Christensen [2010]) have argued that evidential probabilities should some-
times be modest, and that seems to be the default intuitive position. So it’s
worth working out the consequences of such modesty for deference principles.
Also, if no plausible deference principle could be made consistent with the
modesty of evidential probabilities, some of us might construe that as a new
argument against modesty.
philosophers’ imprint - 12 - vol. 14, no. 35 (december, 2014)
richard pettigrew & michael g. titelbaum Deference Done Right
Another way to put the objection is that (PX) is incompatible with
the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence about what’s ratio-
nal. If such evidence is possible, we can have a situation in which the
true evidential probabilities for an agent are captured by Cj but the
agent’s evidence leaves open the possibility that the evidential proba-
bilties are Ci. Since the evidence leaves open the possibility of ei, and Cj
reflects what it’s rational for the agent to believe on that evidence, we
will have Cj(ei) > 0. But then (PX) will prevent the agent from assign-
ing any credence to ej. In cases with misleading higher-order evidence,
(PX) bars an agent from deferring to the credences that are rationally
required by her evidence.18
(IX) does not prevent an agent from deferring to modest evidential
probabilities, but does forbid deference if those probabilities are toler-
ant of immodesty. Thus a move from (PX) to (IX) in hopes of maintain-
ing the possibility of rational modesty is ultimately self-defeating. The
(IX) defender hopes to open up the possibility that some bodies of evi-
dence could require an agent to be unsure whether she has responded
rationally. But what of the agent’s being unsure about whether such
modesty is the rational response? Could an agent’s evidence leave her
rationally uncertain whether it’s the kind of evidence that demands
modesty or not? Certainly the modesty impulse moves us to admit
the possibility of such cases. But on (IX), the only candidate responses
to her evidence an agent can entertain that are modest about whether
they are correct are at the same time absolutely certain that such mod-
esty is required in response to the present evidence.
And again, (IX) is incompatible with certain kinds of mislead-
ing higher-order evidence. Suppose the evidential probabilities for an
agent are captured by Ci, but her evidence leaves open the possibility
that the evidential probabilities are some immodest Cj. In other words,
Ci(ej) > 0 and Cj(ej) = 1. Then (IX) forbids the agent’s assigning Ci
18. Compare Elga’s argument for his New Rational Reflection Principle over
Christensen’s Rational Reflection (which is essentially (PX) applied to eviden-
tial probabilities) [Elga, 2013].
positive credence. (IX) also fails as an account of deference to evidential
probabilities.
As before, (NX) imposes neither of these implausible constraints on
our credences in the various expert hypotheses; indeed, it imposes no
constraints at all on such credences.
6.2 Evidential probabilities and updating
We know that (IX) and (NX) are not preserved by conditionalizing. On
the accounts of deference that they provide, one might defer to the ev-
idential probabilities at one time, then learn a new piece of evidence,
condition on it and thereby fail to defer to the updated evidential prob-
abilities at the later time. Nonetheless, we can make a similar move
here to the one we made above to rescue (NX): When one updates on
new evidence, one does not then defer to the updated evidential prob-
abilities. Rather, at the earlier time and at the later time (and indeed at
any time), one ought to defer to the prior evidential probabilities: that
is, those distributions that are candidates for being the distribution we
condition with a body of evidence to obtain the unique rational cre-
dences in the light of that evidence.
In this case, this move is extremely plausible. Evidential probabili-
ties are the ultimate analyst experts. We defer to them not because of
the evidence they possess — they always possess precisely what we
possess — but because of their ability to assign appropriate credences
in response to that evidence. Thus, it is natural to formulate the defer-
ence we owe to the evidential probabilities as follows: Our credence in
a proposition X conditional on the prior evidential probabilities being
given by Ci should be equal to Ci’s probability for X conditional on
our current evidence and the fact that Ci is the true evidential prior.
Once more, (NX) is the only deference principle that neither im-
poses implausibly strong synchronic constraints nor conflicts with
plausible diachronic constraints.
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7. Deferring to oneself
Finally, we turn to the deference one owes to oneself. This comes in
two forms: one ought to defer to one’s current credences, and one
ought to defer to one’s future credences. The former is the thought
behind Christensen’s principle of Self-Respect [Christensen, 2007, 322];
the latter is the thought behind van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle [van
Fraassen, 1984].
7.1 Deferring to one’s current credences
Let us first consider deference to one’s current credences. Some
philosophers suggest that an agent ought to be certain, at a particu-
lar time, what her credences are at that time. Moran has suggested
that the question ‘Do I believe that p?’ is transparent to the question
‘Is p true? [Moran, 2001].19 It’s even harder to separate out the analo-
gous questions concerning an agent’s partial beliefs. Asking an agent
to report her credence in p and asking her to assess what she takes
her credence in p to be can each be accomplished with the query ‘How
confident are you that p?’. Any divergence between an agent’s actual
credence values and what she thinks those values might be could lead
to strange courses of thought and behavior — for instance, if she some-
times accepts and rejects bets based on her actual credences but at
other times acts on what she thinks her credences are.
But we can align an agent’s first- and second-order opinions with-
out demanding that her credences be perfectly transparent to her at all
times. For example, one might think that a higher-order report is just
a report of one’s expectation of one’s first-order credences. For that to
line up with actual first-order credences would be for an agent to de-
fer to her current credences in line with (IX) — where the candidates
are possibilities one is entertaining for what one’s own credence dis-
tribution might be, and cr(ei) gives one’s credence that ei represents
19. See also Evans [1982, p. 225].
one’s actual opinions. The “true expert” is then just one’s actual distri-
bution.20
In this context, a modest candidate is a distribution that is uncer-
tain what values it assigns; its values are not completely transparent to
itself. A modest candidate intolerant of immodesty goes further, ruling
out the very possibility that it’s transparent. This candidate displays a
form of negative introspection: its probabilities are not transparent and
it is certain they are not. On the other hand, an immodest candidate is
certain what values it assigns. Since it knows its own assignments, it is
certain of its own immodesty (and therefore is intolerant of modesty).
So an immodest candidate’s probabilities display positive introspec-
tion: its probabilities are transparent and it is certain that they are so.
(IX) is not the only possibility for how an agent might defer to her
own credences. Start with (PX). In this context, (PX) is the principle
that Christensen calls Self-Respect; Skyrms calls it Miller’s Principle,
though that name is usually reserved for what is now called the Prin-
cipal Principle [Skyrms, 1980, 112]. By Proposition 3.1, we see that it
demands certainty in transparency — certainty that one has got one’s
own credences exactly right. This seems too strong. That is not to say
that it is rationally prohibited to be certain of one’s own transparency.
Indeed, if an agent is certain of her own transparency, and she is right
about this, then she can be certain she satisfies (PX).21 But such cer-
tainty is not rationally compelled [Williamson, 2000].
So consider (IX). It says one’s credences ought to match up with
one’s expectations of one’s credences. Proposition 3.2 tells us that un-
der (IX), an agent can assign positive credence only to a candidate
that assigns no credence to other, immodest candidates. Thus all of the
agent’s credence will go either to immodest candidates (who assign no
credence to other candidates of any type) or to modest candidates that
20. As earlier, having finitely many candidates is plausible if we assume that
real agents are capable of assigning credence values only to so many decimal
points.
21. If Ci(ei) = 1, then Ci(X | ei) = Ci(X). (Suppressing E again for obvious
reasons.)
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disregard immodest alternatives. In the current context, that means
the agent will consider only distributions with positive introspection
and distributions with negative introspection. She must not assign any
positive credence to the possibility that her credences are not transpar-
ent and yet are unsure about their transparency. As before, this is too
strong. Neither positive nor negative introspection is rationally com-
pelled; so an agent can believe herself rational without being certain
that her credences satisfy one of these two conditions.
Now consider the tension between (IX) or (NX) and Conditionaliza-
tion in this context. Consider (IX). It turns out that, if (IX) and Con-
ditionalization are both rational requirements, then an agent who un-
derstands what rationality requires and who believes herself to satisfy
these rational requirements cannot in fact be rational. Let’s see why
that’s so. If she is rational, she satisfies (IX) with respect to candidate
distributions Ci at time t. Now suppose that, between t and the later
time t0, she receives some new evidence E. If she believes that she is
rational and understands that Conditionalization is a rational require-
ment, she believes that her credences at t0 are obtained from her cre-
dences at t by conditionalizing on E. Thus, her candidates at t0 are D1,
. . ., Dn, where Di( ) = Ci(  | E). But if she is rational she will have
updated by Conditionalization, so her true credences will be given by
cr0( ) = cr(  | E). In that case she cannot satisfy (IX) at the later time
t0. So she is not rational.
Similarly, suppose (NX) is the required deference rule, which the
agent satisfied at t. If two of her Cis happen to converge to the same
Di under her new evidence, she cannot believe she is rational while
obeying all that rationality requires.
Can we again rescue (NX) by suggesting that our deference be to
priors rather than posterior distributions at a time? Yes. Christensen
describes deferring to one’s own credences as a mark of epistemic self-
respect. This self-respect can be achieved as effectively by deferring
to one’s prior as it is by deferring to one’s current credences, pro-
vided one’s current credences are obtained by conditionalizing that
prior. Having said that, it is surely possible for an agent to exhibit epis-
temic self-respect even if their current credence function has not been
obtained from their ur-credence function by conditionalizing on their
evidence. So something of the spirit of Christensen’s principle is lost
by this move.
7.2 Deferring to one’s future credences
Finally, we consider how one might defer to one’s future credences. In
this case, (PX) is a version of van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle, with
the candidates being credence distributions the agent supposes she
might assign at a particular future time. As usual, it demands that an
agent be certain that her future credences are immodest. In this context,
as in the previous section, immodesty amounts to transparency. Thus,
(PX) demands that we assign no credence to the possibility that our
future credences be less than transparent to us at that future time. But
what grounds such confidence in our future transparency?
(IX), as before, demands less. We need not be certain of our future
transparency. But we must be certain that either we will be transparent,
or we will be less than transparent to ourselves and certain of this fact.
Once more, this seems too strong a requirement.
More complicated is the question of how deference to our future
credences interacts with Conditionalization. Suppose C1, . . ., Cn are the
distributions that our agent, at time t, thinks might give her credences
at later time t00. Now suppose that between t and t0 < t00, she learns
E. She updates her credences cr at t to give her credences cr0( ) =
cr(  | E) at t0. But this does not mean she updates each C1, . . ., Cn on
E.
To see why, consider that there must be at least one Ci such that
Ci(E) < 1. If each Ci were certain of E, then the agent would be certain
at t that she was to learn E before t00. That would make the agent
certain of E at t, meaning E could not count as new evidence for her at
t0.
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So at least some of the Ci do not have the agent learning E by t00.
But since the agent has learned E at t0, and t0 < t00, the agent will rule
out such Ci at t0. So the candidates for the agent at t0 will be a proper
subset of her candidates C1, . . ., Cn from time t. Moreover, each of the
remaining candidates will already incorporate E, so there is no need
to condition them on E. The agent’s candidates at t0 really are just a
proper subset of the candidates she considered at t.
The question now arises: Does cr0 satisfy (IX) with respect to her
candidates at t0? We need only tweak Example 1 to see that it need not.
Example 3 Suppose that our agent learns a1a2 _ a1a2. cr0 is obtained from
cr by conditionalizing on this.
cr C1 C2 cr0
e1a1a2 3/32 0 3/16 1/8
e1a1a2 3/32 3/16 0 0
e1a1a2 3/32 3/16 0 0
e1a1a2 7/32 6/16 1/16 7/24
e2a1a2 9/32 0 9/16 3/8
e2a1a2 1/32 1/16 0 0
e2a1a2 1/32 1/16 0 0
e2a1a2 5/32 2/16 3/16 5/24
The problem is that, by learning a1a2 _ a1a2, the agent has learned that C2
must be her future credence. It is the only one of the two that is certain of
a1a2 _ a1a2. Thus, by (IX), the agent ought to have credences that match the
probabilities given by C2. But, if she conditionalizes, they don’t.
(NX), on the other hand, fares well. We need not even make the
move to prior distributions here since, as pointed out above, none of
the agent’s candidates converge — they merely atrophy. Thus, (NX)
is preserved by Conditionalization when we defer to our future cre-
dences.
8. Conclusion
We have examined three possible principles of deference to experts,
based on three models found in the literature. While we make no claim
that our list is exhaustive, of the options considered we find (NX) to
be all-around best. On the one hand, it does not require implausibly
strong certainties about the rational possibilities available to an agent.
On the other hand, it is consistent with updating by Conditionalization,
as long as deference is made to a candidate expert’s priors instead of
to her distribution posterior to the evidence.
We conclude by pointing out that (NX) may place constraints not
only on an agent’s credences, but also on the credences of experts to
whom she should defer. Think back to the evidential probabilities ap-
plication of (NX). Among the candidate prior evidential probability
functions is the one true expert function. (The “true expert analyst,” if
you like.) For that function to be the true expert is just for it to dictate
any agent’s rational response to any possible course of evidence. So if
the agent with credence function cr is rational, for any body of total
evidence E she will have
cr( ) = Cj(  | E)
where Cj is the true expert function.
If (NX) is true, then for rational cr we have:
cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | Eei)
Using the previous equation to expand the left-hand side yields
Cj(x | Eei) = Ci(x | Eei)
This must hold for any E; since that includes tautologous E, we can
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generalize to
Cj(x | ei) = Ci(x | ei)
which is really just (NX) applied to an “agent” (the prior evidential
probability function Cj) whose total evidence set is empty.
(NX) constrains not just the credences of the agent doing the defer-
ring, but also the credences of the true expert among the candidates
to whom she defers. Thus if the agent knows both (NX) and Condi-
tionalization are correct, she can use (NX) to whittle down her list of
candidate experts. But that shouldn’t be surprising. (NX) is supposed
to express a rational requirement; little wonder that it is satisfied by
the perfectly rational credence distribution.22
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
1. Suppose cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | E). Then, since cr considers e1, . . ., en to
be exhaustive and mutually exclusive:
cr(x) =
n
Â
i=1
cr(ei)cr(x | ei) =
n
Â
i=1
cr(ei)Ci(x | E)
2. Suppose Ci(ei | E) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
• (PX), (NX). Since Ci(ei | E) = 1, we have Ci(x | Eei) = Ci(x | E).
Thus, cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | E) iff cr(x | ei) = Ci(x | Eei).
• (PX)) (IX). See (1).
22. We are very grateful to the following people for very helpful discussion of
earlier versions of this paper: Adam Elga, Jenann Ismael, Grant Reaber, Joshua
Schechter, and anonymous referees for this journal. Richard Pettigrew was sup-
ported by an ERC Starting Researcher Grant ’Epistemic Utility Theory: Foun-
dations and Applications’ during his work on this paper. Michael Titelbaum
was supported by funds from the William F. Vilas Trust Estate.
• (IX)) (PX). Suppose cr(x) =
n
Â
i=1
cr(ei) · Ci(x). Then
cr(x | ek) = cr(xek)cr(ek)
=
Âni=1 cr(ei) · Ci(xek | E)
Âni=1 cr(ei) · Ci(ek | E)
=
Ck(xek | E)
Ck(ek | E) since Ci(ek | E) = Ci(xek | E) = 0 if i 6= k= Ck(x | Eek) = Ck(x | E)
This completes the proof. ⇤
3. Similar to (1).
This completes our proof. ⇤
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose cr(ei) > 0. Then cr(ei | ei) is defined. Since cr is a probability
function, cr(ei | ei) = 1. But, by (PX), cr(ei | ei) = Ci(ei | E) < 1. This
gives a contradiction and completes the proof. ⇤
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose (IX) and suppose that, for some i, there exists j 6= i such
that Cj(ej | E) = 1 and Ci(ej | E) > 0. Now suppose for reductio that
cr(ei) > 0.
By (IX),
cr(ej) = . . .+ cr(ei) · Ci(ej | E) + . . .+ cr(ej) · Cj(ej | E) + . . .
By assumption, Cj(ej | E) = 1. So
cr(ej) = . . .+ cr(ei) · Ci(ej | E) + . . .+ cr(ej) · 1+ . . .
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Then, subtracting cr(ej) from both sides, we have
0 = . . .+ cr(ei) · Ci(ej | E) + . . .+ 0+ . . .
Since all the terms on the right-hand side of this equation must be
non-negative (being products of probability values), this gives us
cr(ei) · Ci(ej | E) = 0
But we supposed both these multiplicands were positive, so we have a
contradiction.
⇤
A.4 Proof of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
Suppose
• cr is the agent’s credence function at t. Her total evidence at t is E.
• cr0 is the agent’s credence function at t0. Her total evidence at t is
E0.
• cr0 is obtained from cr by conditionalizing on E. That is, cr0( ) =
cr(  | E0).
• The candidates at t are C1, . . . ,Cn.
• For each candidate Ci, Ei is the partition from which Ci will obtain
evidence between t and t0.
• The candidates at t0 are D1, . . . ,Dm.
Thus, for each Di, there are pairs Cj and X 2 Ej such that Di( ) =
Cj(  |X). So, if ei says that Ci is the true expert at t, and fi says that
Di is the true expert at t0, then
fi ⌘
_
ej ,X2Ej :Di( )=Cj(  |X)
ejX
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Suppose cr satisfies (PX). That is, cr(  | ei) =
Ci(  | E). Then
cr0(x | fi) = cr(x | E0 fi) = cr
0@x
       _ej ,X2Ej :Di( )=Cj(  |X) E0ejX
1A
But, for each ej,X 2 Ej such that Di( ) = Cj(  |X),
cr(x | E0ejX) = Cj(x | E0X) = Di(x | E0).
Now, if c(X|A) = c(X|B) for mutually exclusive A, B, then c(X|A _
B) = c(X|A) = c(X|B). So
cr
0@x
       _ej ,X2Ej :Di( )=Cj(  |X) E0ejX
1A = Di(x | E0)
So cr0(x | fi) = Di(x | E0), as required.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Suppose that cr satisfies (NX). That is,
cr(  | ei) = Ci(  | Eei). And suppose that, for each Di, there is ex-
actly one ei and exactly one X 2 Ei such that Di( ) = Ci(  |X). Then
fi ⌘ Xei. So
cr0(x | fi) = cr(x | E0 fi) = cr(x | E0Xei) = Ci(x | E0Xei) = Di(x | E0 fi)
as required. ⇤
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